Did the Crisis Change it All? Evidence from Monetary and Fiscal Policy by Mitreska, Ana et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Did the Crisis Change it All? Evidence
from Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Ana Mitreska and Maja Kadievska Vojnovic and Ljupka
Georgievska and Branimir Jovanovic and Marija Petkovska
National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia
November 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43163/
MPRA Paper No. 43163, posted 7 December 2012 19:23 UTC
National bank of the Republic of Macedonia 
Research Department 
 
Working paper 
DID THE CRISIS CHANGE IT ALL? EVIDENCE FROM MONETARY AND FISCAL 
POLICY 
Ana Mitreska, MSc* 
MBA Maja Kadievska Vojnovic* 
Ljupka Georgievska, MSc* 
Branimir Jovanovic, MSc* 
Marija Petkovska* 
 
ABSTRACT 
The recent financial and economic crisis has triggered bold and diverse policy responses to prevent 
further, sharper and prolonged adverse effects to the financial and the real sector. The measures for 
alleviating the cycle were a feature both of the advanced and the emerging and developing economies, 
albeit less pronounced in the latter. The bulk of extraordinary measures undertaken refers to providing 
monetary and fiscal stimulus, implying possible change within the monetary and the fiscal policy reaction 
function. Hence, in this study we estimate monetary and fiscal policy reaction function, on a sample of 61 
advanced and emerging and developing countries, using panel techniques. Since the purpose is to assess 
the potential change in the reaction functions during the recent crisis, estimates are done for the period 
prior and during the crisis. More precisely, we have analyzed whether monetary and fiscal policies have 
been more focused on closing the output gap during the recent crisis vis-à-vis the period before the crisis. 
Our findings prove that  the magnitude of the reaction has been much stronger during the crisis period. In 
addition to this key research question, the analysis investigates whether policy responses in the advanced 
economies have been stronger compared to the ones in developing economies. Advanced economies 
appear to have been much more aggressive in stabilizing output during crisis compared to their emerging 
and developing counterparts. Finally, the role of the constraints - the exchange rate regime, the initial 
conditions in context of external position (the current account balance and the level of external 
indebtedness), as well as the fiscal space (public debt) -  is also explored. We find that the pegged 
exchange rate regime, the high current account and the high external indebtedness have constrained 
monetary authorities to respond to inflation and output during crisis, while there is mixed evidence for the 
constraining role of the high level of public debt to the fiscal policy reaction.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
After the default of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008, the financial markets turmoil, 
which started in August 2007, turned into one of the most severe and synchronized global 
economic downturn since 1930s. Against the background of appalling state of the financial 
system and perceived urgency of preventing a very deep recession, monetary and fiscal 
authorities responded with bold and decisive interventions, including measures that were 
unprecedented in nature, scope and timing. The bulk of the extraordinary measures undertaken 
refers to providing monetary and fiscal stimulus, implying possible changes within the monetary 
and the fiscal policy reaction function. Furthermore, policy responses have differed markedly 
among different economies. Differences may reflect the initial conditions in terms of  
international exposure, financial and external vulnerabilities, as well as heterogeneity in 
macroeconomic setups. For example, the lower stage of development and the relatively low 
integration in the world financial market, has most likely helped emerging and developing 
economies to avoid turmoil on their financial markets, while at the same time advanced 
economies were facing severe disorders, with important financial institutions collapsing or 
"pleading" for bailouts. On the other hand, the greater external vulnerability has very much 
narrowed the scope for emerging and developing economies to take more vigorous monetary and 
fiscal measures.  
 
In this study we try to evaluate the potential change in the policy reaction functions triggered by 
the latest crisis. Hence, we estimate the conventional monetary and fiscal policy reaction 
function prior and during the crisis, on a sample of 61 advanced and emerging and developing 
countries, using panel technique. We restrict our empirical analysis to the conventional policy 
instruments. More precisely, our research is focused to answer: whether monetary and fiscal 
policies have put more weight on the output gap during the recent crisis, vis-à-vis the period 
before the crisis? In addition to this key research question, the analysis investigates whether 
policy responses in the advanced economies were stronger compared to the ones in emerging and 
developing economies. Finally, the role of the potential constraints - the exchange rate regime, 
the initial conditions in context of external position (current account balance and level of external 
indebtedness) as well as the fiscal space (constrained by public debt) - for more vigorous policy 
responses are also explored. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a chronological overview of policy 
responses employed by advanced and emerging and developing economies during crisis. Section 
III discusses the data and methodology. Section IV documents the empirical results. Section V 
concludes. 
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II. POLICY RESPONSES TO THE RECENT CRISIS  
 
The 2007-09 global economic and financial crisis caused hardship around the world, posing 
complex challenges for central banks, both in advanced and emerging and developing 
economies. In order to cope with the crisis, the most severe one since the Great Depression, 
central banks were compelled to clearly depart from the conventional monetary policy 
implementation framework (Ishi et al, 2009), by employing unprecedented easing measures and 
developing new innovative tools. This particularly refers to central banks in advanced economies 
(hereafter referred to as AE), which on the backdrop of systemic financial stress and rapidly 
weakening economic fundamentals, aggressively cut interest rate and heavily engaged 
themselves in so-called balance sheet policies. Emerging and developing economies (hereafter 
referred to as EDE) also eased monetary conditions at large. However, due to their 
characteristics, the specific macroeconomic context that they are operating in and the varied 
degrees of external and financial vulnerabilities, EDE response to the crisis considerably differed 
from that of AE as in timing, type, magnitude and novelty.  
AE were the first to be affected by the financial turbulence, since it erupted in mid-summer 2007, 
provoking their central banks to have an early reaction with anti-crisis intervention measures. 
Still, even as signs of stress appeared in the financial system, during the initial stage in late 2007 
and the first half of 2008, shocks seemed to be isolated and limited to liquidity strains on AE 
money and short-term credit markets. The events that followed later on, with the financial 
disorder progressively evolving into the deepest and broadest financial and economic crisis since 
the 1930s, were hard to imagine at that time. In such circumstances, major central banks 
generally reacted through their conventional means by raising the scale of their liquidity-
providing operations. Besides the U.S. Federal Reserve (FED), which almost instantaneously 
engaged in aggressive interest rate cut
*
, during the first year of the crisis, the rest of the AE 
central banks did not ease their interest rates much. In mid 2008, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) even raised its main refinancing rate because of concerns related to the ongoing inflation 
pressures within the euro zone. One year later, in its 79th Annual Report, BIS will note that 
policymakers have underappreciated the extent of the slowdown in mid-2008 and the strength of 
the associated disinflationary forces, so they reacted the way they reacted, by increasing the 
policy rates or keeping them unchanged (BIS 79th Annual Report, pp.92). 
With the events of September 2008, the crisis entered into a new stage, far more challenging for 
monetary policy and world economy overall. The failure of Lehman Brothers and intervention of 
AIG led to hoarding liquidity by financial and nonfinancial companies and severely disrupted 
monetary policy transmission channels. Economic activity started to collapse, which along with 
the apparent prospects of deflation made aggressive monetary easing critical. Against this 
background, AE central banks responded by decreasing policy rates and more ample liquidity-
providing interventions, both in domestic and foreign currency. As of the beginning of 2009, as 
economic contraction was proceeding with alarmingly progressive pace, AE central banks 
continued to ease their monetary policy stance more forcefully. They cut policy interest rates to 
                                                          
*
 Federal funds rate was reduced by 325 bps to 2 percent between July 2007 and June 2008. 
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historical lows, near the effective lower-bound, and several publicly committed to maintaining 
them at these levels for prolonged periods (FED, Bank of Canada). However, given the size of 
the shocks, the severely impaired monetary policy transmission channels and appalling state of 
the financial sector and the economy at large, it became clear that the well-known traditional 
monetary policy instrument, i.e. the policy rate, though effective in the pre-crisis period, would 
not be sufficient for AE to bridge over this crisis episode. Bearing this in mind and constrained 
by the zero bound on the interest rates, most of the AE central banks shifted their focus to 
"balance sheet policies", thus hiring some "unconventional" measures in the form of quantitative 
and qualitative easing. The role of these balance sheet policies was to target particular segments 
of the transmission mechanism, involving initiatives to alleviate strains in wholesale interbank 
markets and supporting specific credit markets (BIS, 2009). However, as noted by Gerlach 
(2010), many of the facilities employed by the central banks were not that novel in their essence, 
as they had actually been in place before the crisis, although the terms and conditions have been 
changed in response to the new environment (Gerlach, 2010, pg.52). Repo-operations have 
already been well established as standard monetary instrument for providing the financial sector 
with liquidity. During the crisis they had only modified their role with central banks considerably 
increasing the scale and extending the maturity of these operations. Lending facilities were also 
in place before, even though during the crisis central banks had considerably enhanced access, 
increased the number of counterparts and expanded eligible collateral. Several central banks 
provided liquidity by purchasing large amounts of securities directly. FED and the Bank of 
England introduced a few new facilities such is the Term Auction Facility in the US, while with 
the purpose of meeting foreign exchange liquidity shortfalls FX swaps were employed. As a 
result, AE central banks' balance sheets considerably expanded in size and modified in 
composition, urging for appropriate exit-strategies as soon as the crisis fades away. 
EDE central banks also responded to the crisis, though their measures differed from those of AE 
in timing, type and magnitude. EDE central banks generally started to implement anti-crisis 
measures later. These measures were of a smaller magnitude compared to AE's and were mainly 
focused on foreign exchange liquidity. As noted in several studies exploring the crisis (Fujita et 
al, 2010; Ishi et al, 2009), these differences can be related to the varied degrees of financial stress 
and external vulnerability in EDE compared to AE, as well as the varied macroeconomic context 
that the two groups of countries are operating in. Thus, due to their lower stage of development 
and the relatively lower degree of financial integration into the global market, the first stage of 
the crisis with financial turmoil hitting the AE, had limited or no effects on EDE. EDE financial 
systems remained sound and stable with their liquidity markets staying functional at large. In 
such circumstances there was no need for EDE central banks to react early on the crisis by easing 
their monetary policy stance. Actually, before September 2008, alike ECB, several EDE also 
raised their policy rates in response to the inflationary pressures prevailing at that time. However, 
September 2008 marked the turning point for EDE with crisis starting to spill-over on their 
territories as well. As Lehman brothers bankruptcy tensions sky-rocketed, markets froze and 
global liquidity dried up. This was instantaneously felt on EDE foreign exchange markets, 
posing strong pressures for EDE domestic currencies to depreciate. In order to mitigate tensions, 
EDE central banks largely focused on foreign exchange liquidity measures. So, access to foreign 
liquidity facilities was relaxed at large and in some countries new tools were introduced, such as 
foreign exchange repo-transactions, credits and swaps. Guided by their domestic markets 
position, several central banks raised the scale of their liquidity-providing operations in domestic 
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currency as well. Reactions with interest rate cuts came in the crisis later on, with economic 
activity being slumping and inflation expectations being stabilized at large. Still, this was done 
cautiously and at a considerably lesser extent compared to AE. Thus, EDE policy rates remained 
well above the effective lower bound on interest rates. The potential risks of repeated 
deterioration of the external imbalances limited the room for maneuver precluding more 
aggressive counter-cyclical adjustments in EDE monetary policy stance. EDE did not resort to 
unconventional monetary policy tools as much, which can be explained by the less disrupted 
monetary transmission that their central banks had to deal with and the monetary policy not been 
constrained by zero lower bound on interest rates. The near absence of quantitative and credit 
easing measures caused the sizes of EDE central banks' balance sheets to increase by much less 
compared to AE.  
Summing up, central banks, both in AE and EDE have heavily intervened during the recent 
crisis, though the effectiveness of the measures that were undertaken is hard to measure, 
particularly with respect to the balance sheet policies. Still, what matters is that they  
considerably contributed towards alleviating the liquidity strains, thus enhancing the state of the 
key markets. Beginning from the third quarter of 2009, economic activity also started to resurge 
at large, principally in AE, which is an additional fact in favor of monetary policy effectiveness. 
Still, what is indisputable is that monetary policy was only one way of stabilizing the economy. 
Without fiscal policy supporting the monetary policy to a large extent, the necessary stabilization 
would have hardly been achieved, meaning that during this crisis fiscal policy has certainly 
witnessed its revival as potent macroeconomic tool. 
As the space for further monetary easing was diminishing, and the collapsed financial system 
impaired monetary transmission channels as well, the role for the fiscal policy in stimulating 
aggregate demand and restoring confidence was increasing. Many advanced economies 
employed bold and diverse fiscal stimulus packages, giving the discretionary component a large 
weight. Hence, despite the previous consent for the discretionary fiscal policy not to be used as a 
countercyclical tool, the depth and the length of the crisis asked for a more aggressive fiscal 
approach. The emphasis on the discretionary fiscal measures became even more prominent and 
viable at the same time, as in the later stage of the crises it was certain that the current recession 
would be long lasting. Hence, the well known shortcoming of the fiscal measures, the long 
internal lags, in a longer recession was more probable not to be an obstacle.  
The first involvement of the fiscal authorities refers to the recapitalization of banks and 
government guarantees aimed at stabilizing the impaired financial system and regaining the 
confidence. Yet, as the financial crisis unfolded and transformed itself into a serious economic 
recession, a wider and stronger set of fiscal measures was required for alleviating the cycle. By 
the end of May, 2009, many OECD and non-OECD emerging economies announced fiscal 
stimulus packages (BIS, 2009). The size of the fiscal stimulus varies greatly among countries. 
The differences are not conditioned on the severity of the output drop, but mostly on the 
effectiveness of the automatic stabilizers. The largest stimulus was seen in US (gravitating at 
around 2% of GDP in 2009 and 2010, each), Korea (with cumulative stimulus at around 3.5% of 
GDP in 2009 and 2010) and Germany (with cumulative stimulus at around 3% of GDP in 2009 
and 2010), while in countries like France and Italy the size of the fiscal stimulus was below 1% 
of GDP. Apart of the built–in automatic stabilizers, the difference in the magnitude of the 
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discretionary fiscal impulse was driven to a large extent by certain country specifics. This mainly 
refers to the initial “fiscal space”, i.e. the cyclical position of the fiscal policy prior to the crisis. 
For most of the AE, the fiscal policy prior to the crisis followed the countercyclical pattern, by 
saving in “good” times and spending in “bad” times, thus alleviating the business cycle. Hence, 
there was enough room for employing bold fiscal stimulus measures in these economies. For 
those economies where a pro cyclical fiscal pattern was followed prior to the crisis, a large 
discretionary package could lead to serious endangering of the fiscal sustainability. Furthermore, 
economies with accumulated public debt were also heavily constrained, as the widening of the 
budget deficit could yield in jeopardizing the debt sustainability. The proactive fiscal policy was 
also hampered by the policy frameworks in certain economies. This mainly refers to countries 
with an exchange rate peg, where currency pressures driven by the falling external demand and 
reversal in the capital inflows, did not allow for growth supporting fiscal policy stance.  
The fiscal response to the recent crisis, in almost all countries followed the traditional recipes of 
utilizing, both the revenue and expenditure policies for boosting the aggregate demand. In many 
economies, the poor economic outlook was driven by the fall in the personal consumption, on the 
backdrop of slacked labor market and gloomy expectations. Aiming at stimulating the 
consumption, the bulk of the revenue measures were concentrated in alleviating the personal tax 
burden (close to 0.8% of GDP, cumulative 2009 and 2010). Albeit important, the other tax reliefs 
(business taxes, consumption and other taxes) jointly did not exceed the personal tax measures. 
As for the expenditures measures, albeit it is believed for the government consumption stimulus 
to have the outmost effect in shortening the length of the crisis, much of the emphasis within this 
crisis was put on public investment measures. “Fifteen of the G20 have announced plans to 
increase spending on infrastructure, largely on transportation networks (Canada, France, 
Germany, and Korea, among others), either in the form of direct central government spending, or 
through capital transfers to local authorities. According to Horton et al (2009), the emerging G20 
countries have announced somewhat larger stimulus packages for 2009, on average, than the 
advanced G20 countries. This reflects smaller automatic stabilizers and consequently, greater 
need, as well as substantial fiscal space in key emerging market countries. China, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, and South Africa have introduced large packages. Emerging market discretionary 
measures are also more heavily weighted to infrastructure investment and less focused on 
income tax cuts” (Bontas at al, pg. 10). 
 
The fiscal implications of the fiscal responses during the recent crisis have been the largest ones 
since the Second World War (IMF, 2010). According to the IMF, in a sample of 32 advanced 
economies, 44 emerging economies and 49 developing countries, 40% of the countries were 
running overall surpluses in 2007, while in 2009 this share has been envisaged to drop to 10%. 
At the same time, the percentage of countries with budget deficit exceeding 3% of GDP has 
increased from 20% to 70%. In the AE (G-20) the budget deficit increased from 2% of GDP in 
2007 to 10% of GDP in 2009, not only being driven by the expenditure policies, but also from 
the lasting effect of the crisis on the revenue collection from the falling assets prices, financial 
services and lowered potential output. At the same time, a sharp increase in the public debt is 
expected to be seen, from around 70% of GDP in 2007 to above 100% of GDP in 2014. 
Although the debt burden for EDE is perceived to be much lesser than in AE, still, the associated 
risks are seen as larger. “These economies face important risks, especially from possible 
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international spillovers. Indeed, large debt build-up in the advanced economies could lead to 
higher borrowing costs and crowding out of emerging markets’ borrowers” (IMF, pg.9). 
 
Although the size of the fiscal packages unquestionably was of a magnitude hardly seen before, 
the economic impact in mitigating the slack in the economy is difficult to be estimated precisely. 
Inevitably, policy stimulus is set as one of the main drivers of the gradual economic recovery in 
the second half of 2009. Yet, the quantitative estimates are difficult to be given. For instance, 
based on the previous episodes, it is estimated for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
to have boosted GDP by 1.4 - 3.8 pp in 2009, and less in 2010 (BIS, 2009). Still, as the 
magnitude of the fiscal multipliers is difficult to be gauged, it is also difficult to estimate the 
fiscal impact to GDP. Furthermore, there is a high probability for the multipliers to have 
significantly changed during the recent crisis. On one hand, the argument in favor of larger 
multipliers is the limited access to credits, which can increase the propensity to spend out of each 
additional income, provided through fiscal measures. On the other hand, the increased risks and 
the uncertainty might provoke higher propensity to save, thus reducing the strength of the 
multipliers. In general, it is believed that although the fiscal stimulus was large, the effects are 
seen to be temporary, asking for more profound changes (to a large extent addressing the core 
problems in the financial system) yielding to a more sustainable growth path.  
 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
The study covers 61 countries and employs quarterly data  for the Q1.2000 – Q3.2009 period. 
Following the IMF's World Economic Outlook classification, countries are grouped as 
“advanced economies” and “emerging and developing economies” (AE and EDE, respectively; 
see Appendix, Table A.1. for the list of countries).  
 
The variables used in the study are INTEREST, GAP, CPI_YOY, GOV_BALANCE_CA, 
GOV_EXP_CA, FIXED, HIGH_CA, HIGH_EXT_DEBT, HIGH_PUB_DEBT. INTEREST 
represents the central banks' official interest rate, GAP is the output gap and CPI_YOY 
represents the annual CPI inflation rate. GOV_EXP_CA indicates the expenditures of General or 
Central Government, cyclically adjusted, and GOV_BALANCE_CA represents the balance 
between the cyclically adjusted revenues and expenditures of General or Central Government
†
. 
FIXED is a dummy variables for countries that have a fixed exchange rate, HIGH_CA is a 
dummy variable standing for high current account deficit, HIGH_EXT_DEBT is a dummy 
representing countries with high gross external debt, while HIGH_PUB_DEBT represents 
countries with high public debt.  
 
                                                          
† The cyclically adjusted government expenditure and budget balance represent the expenditure, i.e. balance, that would emerge if the economy 
was on the potential. They are calculated according to the following standard formulas: 
cyclically adjusted revenues = revenues - (elasticity of revenues to output - 1) * output gap * revenues 
cyclically adjusted expenditures = expenditures - (elasticity of expenditures to output - 1) * output gap * expenditures 
cyclically adjusted balance = cyclically adjusted revenues - cyclically adjusted expenditures. 
For the elasticity of expenditures to output, we assume elasticity of 0, which implies that government expenditures do not change with the level of 
economic activity (i.e. a very weak social security net), whereas for the revenues, we assume elasticity of 1, which implies that government 
revenues increase by 1% when output grows by 1%. I 
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Table 1: Variables and sources of data 
 
 
Our empirical analysis is restricted to conventional policy instruments. Much of the monetary 
policy responses involved alternative measure to the interest rate, using the standard monetary 
reaction function might be a partial approach to the policy responses evaluation. Still, as we are 
trying to estimate differences prior and during the crisis and the balance sheet policies were not 
dominant when trying to meet monetary targets, our approach seems reasonable. In answering 
our research questions, we employ standard policy reaction functions. For the monetary policy, 
the standard instrument is the main interest rate of the central bank or the policy interest rate. For 
the fiscal policy, there are more instruments that can be used, thus we employ two of them - the 
budget expenditure and the budget balance, both of them cyclically-adjusted. As explanatory 
variables, in the monetary policy reaction function we use the year-on-year inflation rate and the 
output gap, whereas for the fiscal policy reaction function we use only the output gap. Alongside 
these variables, the policy rules include lags of the dependent variable, for the purpose of better 
explanation of the dynamics. The three basic policy rules are given below: 
 
Reaction function for 
the monetary policy 
interest rate = α1*interest rate(-1) + α2*output gap + α3*y-o-y inflation 
Reaction function for 
the fiscal policy 1 
budget balance = β1*budget balance(-1) + β2*output gap 
Reaction function for 
the fiscal policy 2 
budget expenditure = γ1*budget expenditure(-1) + γ2*output gap 
 
For the purpose of investigating whether monetary and fiscal policies have behaved differently 
during the crisis in comparison to the period before, we estimate the policy rules for two sub-
periods. For investigation of the differences between policies in AE and EDE, we estimate the 
policy rules separately, for both groups of countries. Here, one notable distinction is the 
Variable Description Source
INTEREST
The official interest rate of the central bank (the 
bank rate or the discount rate) at the end of the 
given period (i.e. the quarter) on annual basis. 
For some countries, the money market rate, 
refinancing rate or Lombard rate. 
International Financial Statistics
CPI_YOY
Annual CPI inflation rate, derived from the CPI 
inflation index number, 2005=100.
International Financial Statistics
GAP
Output gap, derived using HP filter, factor 
1600.
International Financial Statistics
GOV_EXP General or Central Government expenditure International Financial Statistics
GOV_BALANCE General or Central Government Budget balance International Financial Statistics
FIXED Dummy for a country with a fixed exchange rate IMF De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes
HIGH_CA
Dummy for a country with high current account 
deficit. It takes value of one for countries whose 
current account deficit/GDP is beyond 5% in 
2007. 
International Financial Statistics
HIGH_EXT_DEBT 
Dummy for a country with high external debt. 
Equals 1 for countries with gross external debt 
above 50% of GDP, for 2005-2007, on 
average.
Quarterly External Debt Statistics - The World Bank
HIGH_PUB_DEBT
Dummy for a country with high public debt, 
exceeding 60% of GDP, for 2005-2007, on 
average.
International Financial Statistics
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specification of the monetary policy reaction function. For AE, the specification is forward-
looking, i.e. we include two leads of the inflation and the output gap, while for EDE (and for 
whole sample of countries) it is backward-looking, i.e. it includes the current value of the 
inflation and the output gap, and two lags as well. Whether interest rate rules are forward- or 
backward-looking is an empirical question, and depends on the manner in which expectations are 
formed. Thus, for developing countries, it does not seem implausible that their future 
expectations are formed in adaptive manner, i.e. on the grounds of past inflation. Finally, to 
answer whether certain factors have acted as constraints to the policies during the crisis, we 
estimate the policy rules for the crisis sub-period, including interaction dummies that represent 
the constraint in the regression (e.g. cross product between the dummy for the fixed exchange 
rate and the output gap).  
 
However, it is worth noting that our interest rate rule deviates from the rules that are usually met 
in the literature. Instead of the deviation of the inflation from the target, we include the actual 
inflation rate. The main argument for this is that we could not find data on targeted inflation for 
all the countries for the whole period. Not all the countries that are included in the analysis are 
inflation targeters (despite the fact that they might still respond to inflation), and even data for 
the target for some of the inflation targeting countries is not available for the whole period. Thus, 
by introducing the actual inflation rate we solve for these problems: we use the same 
specifications for all of the countries, which implicitly assumes that the target for all countries 
for the whole period is stable (if the target is stable, results would be the same, whether the target 
is included or not). Regarding the fiscal policy reaction functions, they are all backward-looking, 
i.e. include one lag of the output gap. 
 
We estimate the policy rules using dynamic panel methods, more precisely, the Arellano-Bover 
method (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Dynamic panel methods are appropriate when the 
relationship between the variables is dynamic in nature (see Baltagi, 2005, p.135), which is 
almost always the case with policy rules, which usually include a lag of the dependent variable 
amongst the independent variables, to capture the smoothing behavior of the policies. The 
Arellano-Bover method uses forward orthogonal deviations to transform the data, i.e. to remove 
the individual effects (for details, see Arellano and Bover, 1995 or Baltagi, 2005, Chapter 8). We 
chose the Arellano-Bover and not the Arellano-Bond method (which uses differencing for 
removing the individual effects) since the former is shown to perform better (see Hayakawa, 
2009). After  the transformation, the Arellano-Bover method uses the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) for estimating the coefficients of the regression.  
 
Regarding the instruments, the dynamic instruments for the dependent variable, for 
computational reasons, are limited to the fourth lag. As for the independent variables, the 
instruments in the forward-looking specifications are the first, the second and the third lag, 
whereas in the backward-looking specifications, the third, the fourth and the fifth lag are used as 
instruments. As a method for assessing the validity of the instruments, we apply the J test, which 
actually tests whether the over-identifying restrictions for the instruments hold. We show the p 
values of the J test, and p values higher than 0.05 imply that the hypothesis that the instruments 
are valid, cannot be rejected. 
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Although dynamic panel methods are considered to be appropriate for panels with short time 
dimension, and our time dimension in some cases is rather long (up to 31), we still applied 
dynamic panel techniques and not panel cointegration models, since our data seemed to be 
stationary (see Appendix, Table A.2.).  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Monetary Policy Reaction Function   
 
The summarized results of the monetary policy reaction functions are presented in Table 2
‡
. The 
coefficients in the table refer to the sum of the coefficients of all lags and leads of a given 
variable (e.g. the coefficient of 0.07 for the output gap in the AE specification, for the pre-crisis 
period, is a sum of the coefficients of the two leads, which are 0.04 and 0.03, respectively). The 
significance, by analogy, refers to the joint significance of the respective coefficients.  
Table 2: Results of the monetary policy reaction function 
  
Looking at the sample of all countries, the change in the monetary policy reaction is noticeable - 
in the pre-crisis period the response to the output gap is insignificant, contrary to the crisis 
period, when the response is highly significant. Regarding inflation, before the crisis, monetary 
policy had significantly reacted to inflation developments, whereas during the crisis it did not. 
The analysis of the results of the sub-groups shows that the response of the monetary policy to 
the output gap in AE is significant in both periods, but considerably stronger during the crisis 
(five times stronger
§
) and that AE tackled inflation before the crisis, but "forgot" about it during 
the crisis period. On the contrary, output developments before the crisis had not appeared as an 
important factor for the monetary policies in EDE, whereas during the crisis, monetary policy 
                                                          
‡ The detailed results are not shown due to space limitations, but are available upon request. 
§ The magnitude of the response is given by the long-run coefficients. The long-run coefficients are calculated when the sum of all the 
coefficients in front of one variable is divided by (1-coefficient in front of the lagged dependent variable). For illustration, the long-run 
coefficient for the output for the crisis period, for AE, is 2 (0.4/(1-0.8)).  
pre-crisis crisis pre-crisis crisis pre-crisis crisis
INTEREST(-1) 0.75 0.74 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.58
*** *** *** *** *** ***
GAP 0.00 0.12 0.07 0.40 -0.03 0.17
*** *** *** ***
CPI_YOY 0.10 -0.02 0.17 -0.32 0.05 0.04
*** *** ***
Cross-sections included 44 43 18 18 26 25
Total panel observations 954 290 432 87 558 173
R-squared 0.74 0.43 0.90 0.23 0.72 0.44
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.42 0.90 0.20 0.72 0.42
J test p value 0.39 0.11 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.27
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%
All countries Advanced economies
Emerging and 
developing economies
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fixed ER high CA high ext. debt
INTEREST(-1) 0.46 0.80 0.58
*** *** ***
GAP 0.25 0.34 0.27
*** ** ***
CPI_YOY 0.24 0.06 0.15
*** ***
FIXED*INTEREST(-1) -0.13
FIXED*GAP -0.12†
FIXED*CPI_YOY -0.54†
**
HIGH_CA*INTEREST(-1) -0.50
***
HIGH_CA*GAP -0.30†
HIGH_CA*CPI_YOY -0.07†
HIGH_EXT_DEBT*GAP -0.34†
***
HIGH_EXT_DEBT*CPI_YOY -0.25†
***
Cross-sections included 43 43 31
Total panel observations 290 290 209
R-squared 0.30 0.08 0.41
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.04 0.38
J test p value 0.24 0.66 0.29
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%
All countries, crisis period
† indicates that the coefficients of the interaction terms, summed with the 
coefficients without the interaction dummies, are jointly insignificant 
had started responding to output. Regarding inflation, EDE reacted in the same manner as AE, 
before and during the crisis.  
Comparing the size of the response to output in AE and EDE, the former group of countries 
reacted much more aggressively to prevent further decline of economic activity. The size of the 
reaction, given by the long-run coefficients, for AE is around 2, whereas for EDE, it is only 0.4. 
Next research question that we turn to is the degree to which the fixed exchange rate, the high 
current account deficit, and the high level of external indebtedness before the crisis, have 
constrained monetary policy during the crisis. Although we are aware about the potentially 
different role of these factors for AE and EDE, the analysis is done on the whole sample. The 
examination of the constraints is made by introduction of interaction variables.  
Table 3: Results of the monetary policy reaction function with the constraining factors 
Looking at the specification with the fixed 
ER, only one interaction variable, between the 
fixed ER and the inflation, appears significant (-
0.54). This implies that the reaction of the 
countries with fixed ER to inflation is 
significantly different (smaller) during the crisis 
period in comparison to countries with flexible 
ER. However, if we look at the joint significance 
of the variables with and without dummies (e.g. 
the coefficient in front of cpi_yoy and the 
coefficient in front of fixed*cpi_yoy), which 
gives the response of the countries with fixed ER 
to inflation, we will see that their response 
towards inflation is insignificant
**
. For 
comparison, the response of the countries with 
flexible ER, which is given by the coefficients 
without the interaction dummies, is significant 
both for inflation and output. Thus, we interpret 
this as an evidence that the fixed ER constrained 
monetary authorities to respond to inflation and 
output during the crisis.  
Looking into the role of high CA, the interaction 
variables with inflation and output are 
insignificant, which implies that countries that had high CA deficit before the crisis, compared to 
countries that did not have high CA deficits, did not respond differently to output and inflation. 
However, if we look at the joint significance of the coefficients with and without interaction 
dummies, they are insignificant both for the inflation and the output, implying that countries with 
                                                          
** This looks odd, indeed, but it might be due to the sample size (290 observations), which is arguably small for GMM estimation. 
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high CA did not respond to output and inflation during the crisis. In contrast, countries that did 
not have high CA deficits before the crisis responded to movements in output, but not in inflation. 
The situation is more clear-cut regarding the role of the high external indebtedness. The 
interaction dummies are significant and negative both for the output and the inflation, implying 
that countries that had high level of external debt before the crisis responded differently to output 
and inflation from countries that were not heavily indebted. The joint significance of the 
coefficients with and without interaction dummies confirms that the countries that were heavily 
indebted did not react to inflation and output during the crisis, whereas countries that were not 
heavily indebted did react.  
To summarize, the change in monetary policy reaction during the crisis period in comparison to 
the period before, in both AE and EDE, is evident. The results show that during the crisis, 
monetary policy was actively used as instrument for output gap smoothing, while the traditional 
reaction to inflation did not take place. In addition, the results demonstrate that there was a 
difference in the conduct of the monetary policy during the crisis between AE and EDE with 
regards to the size of the response to output, with AE reacting much more aggressively to 
economic activity decline
††
. Finally, we find some evidence that the fixed exchange rate, the 
high CA deficits before the crisis and the high external indebtedness have constrained monetary 
policy reaction during the crisis. 
 
Fiscal Policy Reaction Function   
 
The other instrument of the macroeconomic policy that was highly utilized during the crisis was 
fiscal policy. Thus, we next turn to compare the behavior of the fiscal policy before the crisis vis-
à-vis during the crisis and in AE vis-à-vis in EDE, as well as to see if it has been constrained by 
some factors. The results of the two fiscal policy rules are presented in Tables 4 and 5.  
 
Table 4: Results of the fiscal policy reaction function, with the budget expenditure as an 
instrument 
  
 
                                                          
†† The size of reaction, given by the long-run coefficients, for AE is around 2, whereas for EDE, it is only 0.4. 
pre-crisis crisis pre-crisis crisis pre-crisis crisis
GOV_EXP_CA(-1) 0.12 -0.22 0.71 0.02 0.06 -0.57
*** *** *** *** *** ***
GAP 0.02 -0.24 -0.02 -0.29 0.25 -0.13
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Cross-sections included 49 46 27 27 22 19
Total panel observations 1200 304 666 177 534 127
R-squared 0.03 -0.01 0.51 -0.05 0.02 0.09
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 -0.02 0.50 -0.07 0.01 0.07
J test p value 0.62 0.62 0.58 0.77 0.59 0.76
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%
All countries Advanced economies
Emerging and 
developing economies
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At all-countries level, budget expenditures before the crisis were even pro-cyclical (though only 
weakly 0.02), but during the crisis, fiscal policy turned to be counter-cyclical. For the AE 
sample, the budget expenditures appear counter-cyclical for both sub-periods (which complies  
with the most of the empirical studies), but the magnitude is much stronger for the crisis period 
(the long run coefficient is -0.30, compared with -0.07 before the crisis). The most remarkable 
change is observed in the EDE sample. Fiscal policy is significantly pro-cyclical before the crisis 
(0.3), but turns to be counter-cyclical during the crisis period (-0.1). This confirms that the fiscal 
policy was used actively as a stabilization tool, in both, AE and EDE during the crisis. As 
regards the size of the reaction to the output gap, fiscal authorities in AE responded much 
stronger than authorities in EDE during the crisis (-0.3, compared to -0.1). 
 
Table 5: Results of the fiscal policy reaction function, with the budget balance as an instrument 
 
 
Similar results are found when fiscal policy is measured by the budget balance (instead of the 
budget expenditure). These results show that the fiscal policy is counter-cyclical before and 
during the crisis, for all groups of countries
‡‡
 (at aggregate level, and separately). For all the 
countries, the reaction during the crisis is slightly stronger than before the crisis (0.19, vis-à-vis 
0.06). For AE, the magnitude of the reaction to the output gap during the crisis is much stronger 
than before the crisis (nearly four times; 0.45 compared to 0.12), while the reaction of the fiscal 
policy in EDE is marginally stronger (0.10 compared to 0.06).  
                                                          
‡‡ In the specifications with the budget balance, counter-cyclicality is observed when the sign is positive, since this implies that higher output is 
followed by more positive budget balance (i.e. lower deficit). 
pre-crisis crisis pre-crisis crisis pre-crisis crisis
GOV_BALANCE_CA(-1) 0.15 0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.29 -0.09
*** *** ***
GAP 0.06 0.19 0.12 0.45 0.06 0.10
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Cross-sections included 49 46 27 27 22 19
Total panel observations 1200 301 666 174 534 127
R-squared -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.04
Adjusted R-squared -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06
J test p value 0.55 0.97 0.58 0.67 0.54 0.58
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%
All countries Advanced economies
Emerging and 
developing economies
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Table 6: Results of the two fiscal policy reaction functions with a constraining factor 
 
Regarding the role of the constrains to fiscal policy during the crisis, we only explore the role of 
the high public debt (Table 6). Looking at the specification with the budget expenditure, the 
insignificant coefficient in front of the interaction dummy with the output gap indicates that 
governments with high level of public debt before the crisis did not respond differently to output 
fluctuation from governments that were not heavily indebted. Furthermore, the coefficients of the 
variables with and without the interaction dummy (e.g. the coefficient in front of gap and the 
coefficient in front of high_pub_debt*gap), are jointly significant, just like the coefficients in 
front of the gap, which demonstrate that the high public debt was not a constraint for the fiscal 
policy. The results of the specification with the budget balance are slightly different. The 
interaction term between the high debt and the output is insignificant, as well, and suggest that 
governments with high level of public debt did not differ from those with low level of debt in 
terms of their response to output developments, but the coefficients of the output and the output 
times the interaction dummy are jointly insignificant, suggesting that highly indebted 
governments did not respond to output developments, in contrast to governments that were not 
highly indebted.  
 
To summarize, our findings point to a change in the fiscal policy during the crisis, in terms of 
much stronger response to output developments. Fiscal policy was counter-cyclical during the 
crisis in both AE and EDE, but the reaction to output fluctuation was much stronger in AE than 
in EDE. Finally, regarding the constraining role of the high public debt there is a mixed evidence 
for the ability of the fiscal authorities to support the economy during the crisis.  
 
 
All countries, 
crisis period
All countries, 
crisis period
expenditure balance
GOV_EXP_CA(-1) -0.25
***
GAP -0.16
***
HIGH_PUB_DEBT*GOV_EXP_CA(-1) 0.66†
HIGH_PUB_DEBT*GAP -0.15
GOV_BALANCE_CA(-1) -0.07
GAP 0.30
***
HIGH_PUB_DEBT*GOV_BALANCE_CA(-1) 0.94†
HIGH_PUB_DEBT*GAP -0.63†
Cross-sections included 46 46
Total panel observations 304 301
R-squared -0.06 -0.18
Adjusted R-squared -0.07 -0.20
J test p value 0.76 0.81
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%
† indicates that the coefficients of the interaction terms, summed with the 
coefficients without the interaction dummies, are jointly insignificant 
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V. CONCLUSION  
 
The depth and the length of the crisis has provoked sizeable and innovative policy measures, 
both in terms of monetary and fiscal policy. They were aimed at stabilizing the economic cycle 
and lessening the wide negative output gap. The manner and aggressiveness in which both 
policies were used as a countercyclical tools during the recent crisis, were for sure different 
compared to the prior to the crisis period. Although their very effects are difficult to be gauged, 
and probably are of a temporary nature, still it is more than certain that they have prevented 
larger and prolonged output drop.  
 
In our paper we try to give a modest contribution to the literature on the recent crisis, by 
assessing the change in the magnitude of the monetary and fiscal reaction to the output gap, 
before and after the crisis. The results of the panel estimate on 61 AE and EDE, do confirm our 
prior for stronger countercyclical reaction of the monetary and fiscal policy during the recent 
crisis, compared to the period before. As evidenced in many other empirical studies, we also find 
much stronger policy reaction in AE, compared to EDE. Furthermore, our tests on the role of the 
fixed exchange rate, wide current account deficit and high external debt in the monetary policy  
reaction, verify their constraining power for stronger countercyclical reaction. On the other hand, 
we were not able to clarify the constraining role of the high public debt on the fiscal counter-
cyclicality. As during the recent crisis public debt in many countries went beyond our chosen 
threshold, these results might not deviate largely from the practice.  
 
This research does offer intuitive results in terms of the policy reaction, on the backdrop of the 
recent crisis. Yet, it contains flaws which can sketch the future avenues for research 
improvement. This mainly refers to the inclusion of the non-interest rate monetary stimulus 
within the monetary policy reaction function, which can provide a more comprehensive picture  
on the policy responses within the latest crisis.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1.: Groups of countries 
 
 
 
Table A.2.: Results of the unit root tests 
 
 
 
 
 
Advanced economies
Emerging and 
developing economies
Countires with:               
fixed exchange rate
Countries with:             
high current account
Countries with:            
high external debt
Countries with:             
high public debt
Australia Argentina Argentina Armenia Austria Austria
Austria Armenia Belarus Australia Belgium Belgium
Belgium Belarus Bolivia Belarus Bulgaria Croatia
Canada Bolivia Bulgaria Bulgaria Croatia eurozone
Czech Republic Brazil China Croatia Denmark France
Denmark Bulgaria Croatia Estonia Estonia Germany
eurozone Chile Denmark Georgia Finland Greece
Finland China Estonia Greece France Hungary
France Colombia Iran Hungary Germany Italy
Germany Croatia Jordan Iceland Greece Portugal
Greece Estonia Kazakhstan Jordan Hungary Singapore
Iceland Georgia Latvia Kyrgyz Republic Ireland
Ireland Hungary Lithuania Latvia Israel
Israel India Macedonia Lithuania Italy
Italy Indonesia Slovakia Macedonia Kazakhstan
Japan Iran New Zealand Kyrgyz Republic
Korea Jordan Portugal Latvia
Luxembourg Kazakhstan Romania Lithuania
Netherlands Kyrgyz Republic Slovakia Luxembourg
New Zealand Latvia Slovenia Netherlands
Norway Lithuania Spain Norway
Portugal Macedonia Turkey Portugal
Singapore Mexico Slovakia
Slovakia Peru Slovenia
Slovenia Philippines Spain
Spain Poland Sweden
Sweden Romania Switzerland
Switzerland Russia United Kingdom
United Kingdom Serbia
USA Thailand
Turkey
output gap y-o-y inflation interest rate gov. balance gov. expenditure
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 1.000 0.111 0.042 0.000 0.000
Assumes common  unit root
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 0.001 0.367 0.369 0.000 0.000
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 0.000 0.025 0.016 0.000 0.000
PP - Fisher Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
Assumes individual  unit root
The table shows the p values of the corresponding unit root test. Null hypothesis in all cases that there is a unit root, i.e. 
that a series is non-stationary
